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lems	remain	unsolved,	 it	appears	 that	 it	will	not	be	possible	 in	 the	 long	






the	 state	do	not	 so	much	 try	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 state’s	policy	by	us-
ing	their	economic	influence	as	seek	to	take	power	directly	in	order	to	
safeguard	their	interests.	If	for	any	reason	they	are	unwilling	or	unable	
to	 hold	 the	 highest	 state	 positions	 themselves,	 they	will	 appoint	 com-
pletely	dependent	persons	with	no	political	backing	–	the	recent	nomi-
nation	of	Pavel	Filip	(a	close	aide	of	Moldova’s	most	important	politician,	
the	oligarch	Vlad	Plahotniuc)	as	 the	prime	minister	 in	 January	2016	 is	
































































incompatible	with	 the	 constitution,	 and	 amendments	made	 to	 the	 con-
stitution	are	frequently	not	 followed	by	corresponding	modifications	to	
lower-level	legislation.	As	a	result,	Moldova’s	legal	system	is	inconsistent	
and	 internally	 contradictory,	 and	 therefore	 conducive	 to	 constitutional	




political	and	business	groups,	 the	Constitutional	Court	 lacks	 independ-












•	Moldova’s	 economy	 has	 been	 in	 permanent	 crisis	 since	 the	 early	 1990s.	
Over	the	last	quarter	of	a	century,	successive	governments	have	not	been	







































•	Over	 the	first	 twenty	years	of	 independence	 there	have	hardly	been	any	
occasions	when	Moldova’s	elites	 (and	society	at	 large)	were	able	 to	reach	
consensus	about	a	 foreign	policy	orientation	 to	which	 the	 country	 could	
adhere,	irrespective	of	what	political	force	was	in	power	at	the	given	mo-
ment.	 Consequently,	Moldova’s	 foreign	 policy	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	
instability	 and	 variability.	 Chisinau’s	 international	 activities	 have	 been	



























cases	 their	 real	 aim	was	 to	 further	 the	political	 interests	of	 a	particular	
party,	rather	than	to	actually	resolve	the	conflict.	There	are	some	serious	
reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 unrecognised	 Transnistrian	
state	has	been	generating	profits	 for	some	sections	of	 the	Moldovan	elite	



































































































































I. WHo ARE THE MoLdoVAnS? TWEnTY-FIVE YEARS 



























































































































































































































































































































































Family relations vs. politics
Uncertain of its identity, lacking previous experience of independent state-
hood and originating predominantly from the peasant classes, Moldovan 
society attaches a great significance to broadly defined family ties. In Mol-
dova, families are traditionally understood to include not only spouses and 
actual relatives, but also godchildren and godparents, wedding best men, 
etc. Being in a family involves very close relations and generates commit-
ments which are considered to be much more important than obligations 
towards the state or its institutions (given the absence of a civic identifica-
tion and the weakness of the Moldovan state, these are seen as ephemeral 
in comparison to the lasting institution of the family). As a result, what we 
see in Moldova is a variant of the phenomenon of clan relations found for 
instance in Central Asia. 
This phenomenon naturally also extends to the ruling elites, leading to 
nepotism and favouritism, which are rampant in Moldova, because it is 
considered natural to involve clan members in the activities of political 
leaders. Vlad Plahotniuc’s clan may serve as an example: it includes, among 
others, Andrian Candu, the oligarch’s godson who currently holds the posi-
tion of Parliament speaker, and Raisa Apolschii, who was a maid of honour 
at Plahotniuc’s wedding and now heads the Moldovan parliament’s com-






































towards	 reunification	were	members	or	 supporters	of	 the	Liberal	party	whose	approval	















II. THE STATE oF STRUCTURAL CRISIS
1. The evolution of the the political system over 25 years: between 












































































In	 this	way	Voronin	came	 to	control	both	parliament	and	 the	government,	
while	occupying	the	post	of	the	head	of	state	himself.	He	used	his	untrammelled	
10	 http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=470
















































fore	 could	 not	 ensure	 that	 it	would	 stay	 in	 power.	Major	 tampering	with	 the	 elections,	















































ers	 of	 the	 Alliance	 for	 European	 Integration	 see:	 K.	 Całus,	 A	 captured	 state?	Moldova’s	





















































































































Who is Vlad Plahotniuc?
Born in 1966, Vlad Plahotniuc is a billionaire and the wealthiest man in Mol-
dova, with an estate estimated to be worth more than US$ 2 billion. He is 
also the key actor in Moldova’s political life. Plahotniuc started to build his 
business position in the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s he took a managerial 
position in Petrom Moldova, a daughter company of the Romanian fuels gi-
ant, and in this way he established a close relationship with Vladimir Vo-
ronin, the then president of Moldova and leader of the Party of Communists 
(which exercised full power in the country in the years 2001-2009), and his 
son Oleg, one of Moldova’s leading entrepreneurs. According to Plahotniuc’s 
opponents, he has used blackmail and his influence in the state structures 
(including the police, the fiscal services and the administration of justice), 
which he owed to his ties with Voronin, to take over profitable private com-
panies and destroy the competitors of his businesses, while building up his 
wealth thanks to opaque privatisations of state-owned assets. 
When Moldova’s Communists started losing power in 2009, Plahotniuc 
moved on to financially support the Democratic Party, then a marginal 
pro-European group, in order to avoid losing his political influence. Thanks 
to his money the party managed to become the second largest power in the 










































































































































































































































































































4. The legal system and the administration of justice: politicised 































































































































The case of judge dominica Manole
On 30 March 2016 the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova rejected 
a petition, signed by more than 400,000 people, for a referendum to change 
the manner of electing the president and the number of members of parlia-
ment, which would have been inconvenient for the Moldovan leadership. 
In its justification, the Commission argued that even though the petition 
had been signed by twice the required number of people (the constitution 
required 200,000 signatures), the opposition had not met the second condi-
tion required for the petition to be valid, according to which the collected 
signatures needed to represent at least half of the second-tier administra-
tive units of Moldova, with not less than 20,000 signatures collected in each 
of the units. While the constitution does indeed include such a require-
ment, meeting it in the present conditions is extremely difficult or even 
impossible in some administrative units. The constitution was written at 
a time when Moldova’s administrative divisions were different, with only 
eleven second-tier administrative units (the so-called judet). As a result of 
the administrative reform, the number of units, now renamed as raion, in-
creased three-fold, and the new units had much smaller populations. Con-
sequently, in many raions the number of eligible voters is under or barely 
above 20,000 people.
In this connection, the opposition decided to appeal the Central Elector-
al Commission’s decision at the Appellate Court, where judge Dominica 
Manole overturned the Commission’s decision on 14 April 2016. Her verdict, 
however, was appealed at the Supreme Court, which upheld the Central 
Electoral Commission’s decision. At the same time measures were under-
taken against the insubordinate judge. The Central Electoral Commission 
filed a complaint against Manole’s verdict at the SCM, arguing that it had 
been “blatantly incompatible with the law” and “deliberately generated 
a negative public reaction”. Acting general prosecutor Eduard Harunjen 
then requested the SCM to authorise an investigation into suspected “abuse 
of power” by Dominica Manole, allegedly consisting of the usurpation of 
the right to interpret the constitution. On 31 May 2016 the SCM granted 
Harunjen’s request. At the time this paper was completed, judge Manole 
was facing loss of her judge’s immunity, a fine, up to five years in prison and 
loss of the right to serve as a judge.
The	 subordination	 of	 the	 Moldovan	 administration	 of	 justice	 to	 Plahot-





















































































































Combatting rival media – the case of TV7
The series of steps taken against TV7, one of Moldova’s large television sta-
tions controlled by Chiril Lucinschi (son of Petru Lucinschi, the former 
president and high ranking PLDM politician with links to Vlad Filat) is an 
example of how the media independent of Plahotniuc are being targeted in 
Moldova. In February 2016 Moldtelecom (Moldova’s state-owned telecoms 
operator controlled by Vlad Plahotniuc) changed the matrix of cable chan-
nels, as a result of which stations owned by Plahotniuc’s holding were as-
signed positions in the top ten channels, while other televisions, includ-
ing TV7, were moved to positions between 10 and 20. Several weeks later 
a similar decision was taken by Moldova’s largest cable operator, SunCom-
munications. Moreover, Plahotniuc’s holding took steps to limit TV7’s share 
in the advertising market under its control. As a result, TV7, which used to 
be Moldova’s second most viewed channel just a few years ago, started to 
rapidly lose its audience share. By December 2015 it had dropped to 5th posi-
tion, and by April 2016 to 13th.
Thanks	to	his	control	of	the	cable	operators,	Plahotniuc	has	also	been	able	to	


















































III. THE EConoMY: FRoM CoLLAPSE To FRAGILE STABILITY 




























































































Chart 2. Moldova’s GDP per capita dynamics in 1990-2014 - purchasing power 



























































































Chart 3. Moldova’s GDP per capita dynamics in 1990-2014 - purchasing power 








































































































































Chart 5. Dynamics of Moldova’s exports to countries of the former USSR and 















































* excluding Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
Former USSR countries*
EU member states (excluding Croatia)

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impact of mass emigration on the situation of families in Moldova
The number of emigration orphans and half-orphans in Moldova is esti-
mated at 140,000 (around 25% of all children in the country). While UNICEF 
research suggests that children whose parent or parents work abroad have 
better access to quality healthcare and education, at the same time such 
children are much more prone to experience behavioural issues related 
to socialisation and internalisation of social norms. This is visible, for in-
stance, in police statistics showing that one in four juvenile delinquents 
comes from a family in which at least one parent is working abroad. 
Job-related emigration also often leads to divorce, with further adverse im-
pacts on the situation of the children. According to figures of the National 
Bureau of Statistics, since the early 2000s, every second marriage in Moldova 
has broken up. If a mother working abroad divorces her husband, custody of 
the children is often awarded to the father, thus forcing him to emigrate for 
work to support the family. As a result, children are put in the care of more 
distant relatives. Meanwhile, it is known that children raised by relatives 
other than parents or by single parents are more likely to become victims of 







































































































































































































61	 Report	 concerning	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 Convention	 on	 Action	
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VI. THE ConFLICT In TRAnSnISTRIA:  
































75	 For	 extensive	 information	 on	 the	 situation	 surrounding	 the	 Transnistrian	 conflict	 20	



















































































a	result	of	the	signing,	in	1997,	of	the	Memorandum on the principles of normaliza-




































































































































































































The corrupt co-operation between the elites of Moldova 
and Transnistria
The newest example of such action concerns the purchase of energy from 
the Moldavskaya GRES power plant in Transnistria. Before 2014, Moldova, 
a country without any major power plants of its own, imported electric-
ity from Transnistrian and Ukrainian suppliers in roughly equal propor-
tions, which stimulated competition, kept prices down and guaranteed se-
curity of energy supplies. After Donbas effectively seceded from Ukraine 
in 2014, supplies from Ukraine ceased. At the same time, a new company 
called Energokapital started operating in the Transnistrian energy mar-
ket as an intermediary trading electricity produced by Moldavskaya GRES. 
The company sold gas (which it was receiving for free from Russia) to the 
power plant and they bought electricity produced at a price of US$ 0.016 
per kw/h to be further resold to Moldova, the power plant’s only customer 
other than energy consumers in Transnistria. However, the energy would 
not be bought directly by the Moldovan distributor, but instead by another 
intermediary, the Energocom company formally owned by the state. The 
transactions generated huge profits for the Transnistrian company be-













to Moldavskaya GRES. It is estimated that in 2015 alone the Transnistrian 
intermediary made a profit of more than US$ 20 million. 
There are many indications that the beneficiaries of the scheme were 
members of Moldovan and Transnistrian political and business elites. At 
least two facts point toward this. Firstly, Energokapital is owned by a group 
of investors and companies registered in tax havens, some of which have 
links to the banking scandal described before, in the aftermath of which 
around US$ 1 billion was siphoned off from the Moldovan banking sector 
in 2014. One of the owners is the Transnistrian-registered company Bas 
Market, in which Yurii Dzetsul, close friend and aide of the Transnistrian 
‘president’ Yevgeny Shevchuk, holds a considerable stake. The existence of 
an energy trade intermediary on the Moldovan side seems to have no eco-
nomic justification and apparently only serves the above corruption model.
The second fact, which bears out the above hypothesis much more emphati-
cally, is that in 2016, when Ukraine was ready to resume electricity supplies 
to Moldova, the government in Chisinau decided to extend its co-operation 
with Energokapital. Although the company did offer a lower price than be-
fore (US$ 0.049 per kw/h), there was no economic or political justification 
for Chisinau’s decision to preserve Transnistria’s monopoly. The Ukrainian 
side had offered to supply electricity at prices similar to those proposed by 
Transnistria, yet it should be remembered that by using electricity supplies 
from Transnistria, Chisinau effectively pays twice: firstly by covering the 
price of the electricity purchased, and secondly by incurring the growing 
gas debt for which Moldova is liable from Moscow’s point of view. At the 
same time it is clear that relying solely on supplies from Moldavskaya GRES, 
a company owned by the Russian state treasury, poses a major risk to Mol-
dova’s energy security. In this context it is difficult to find any explanation 
for the Moldovan government’s decision other than the corruption schemes 
benefitting the Moldovan political elite implicated in the banking scandal.
Another	consequence	of	the	protracted	Transnistrian	problem	consists	in	the	












































































































































Today’s	Republic	 of	Moldova	 shows	many	 characteristics	 typical	 of	 failing	
states.	Without	an	effective	and	responsible	political	class,	an	efficient	political	
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and	legal	system,	a	coherent	and	generally	acceptable	state	or	idea	of	nation-
hood,	and	finally,	without	a	stable	economy,	Moldova	has	been	unable	not	only	
to	complete	the	transformation	process	started	a	quarter	of	a	century	ago	but	
also	to	effectively	perform	many	of	the	basic	tasks	of	states.	On	top	of	this,	it	
has	no	control	over	parts	of	its	territory	and,	despite	its	neutral	status,	has	been	
struggling	with	the	permanent	presence	of	foreign	troops	within	its	territory.	
Despite	such	pessimistic	prospects	for	the	development	of	Moldova	–	or	more	
correctly	its	stagnation	–	there	seems	to	be	no	risk	that	Moldova	could	lose	its	
formal	independence	in	the	foreseeable	future.	The	main	international	actors	
in	the	region,	including	Russia,	are	interested	in	the	continued	existence	of	the	
Moldovan	state.	From	Moscow’s	point	of	view,	an	imploding	Moldova	which	
chronically	fails	to	reform	is	a	perfectly	acceptable	option.	Contrary	to	politi-
cal	declarations	coming	from	sections	of	the	Romanian	elite,	Bucharest	is	not	
genuinely	interested	in	incorporating	Moldova	into	Romania.	While	the	Roma-
nian	leadership	would	certainly	prefer	Moldova	to	become	a	modern	European	
state	pursuing	ever	closer	co-operation	with	the	West,	it	seems	that	in	order	to	
ensure	its	own	security	and	push	Russian	influence	further	away	from	its	bor-
ders	it	would	also	accept	a	minimum	variant	in	which	Moldova,	in	its	current	
political	shape,	remains	a	neutral	state	outside	the	sphere	of	the	Kremlin’s	di-
rect	influence.	Nevertheless,	the	politically,	economically	and	socially	unstable	
Moldova	as	it	is	today	does	pose	a	serious	challenge	to	both	the	European	Union	
and	Romania	because,	despite	the	huge	scale	of	financial	assistance	provided	
to	it	and	the	unprecedented	political	effort	on	the	part	of	the	EU,	the	country	
is	a	showcase	of	the	failure	of	the	Union’s	policies	aimed	at	transforming	and	
stabilising	the	former	Soviet	states	in	the	EU’s	neighbourhood.	
Kamil Całus 
